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AFTER CONFIDENTIALITY: RETHINKING THE
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
BUSINESS LAWYER
William H. Simon*
INTRODUCTION
Recent business scandals and the regulatory responses to them raise basic
questions about the role of the business lawyer. Lawyers were major
participants in Enron and in similar controversies over corporate disclosure.
Lawyers have also been key players in the corporate tax shelter industry. In
both instances, their conduct has prompted federal regulations that repudiate
to an unprecedented degree the bar's traditional understanding of its
structure and obligations.
The provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandating "up-the-
ladder" reporting by public corporation counsel was the first federal statute
in American history to regulate lawyers directly and broadly. 1 The second
came only two years later-the "Jobs Act" provision imposing
requirements on lawyers engaged in shelter-like tax planning.2  Both
initiatives significantly abrogated the principle of professional "self-
regulation"--the name that both the bar and social science give to the
alliance of trade associations and compliant state judiciaries that have
traditionally asserted regulatory authority over lawyers. And both statutes
unsettle long-rooted conceptions of client loyalty.
The most frequent and vocal response of the organized profession to
these developments has been emphatic reassertion of long-standing
positions. In particular, the bar has been circling the wagons around
confidentiality. Virtually every major corporate firm protested the SEC's
"noisy withdrawal" proposal to require public companies to report their
lawyers' withdrawal "for professional reasons" to the SEC (as companies
* Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University. This essay benefited from helpful
comments at Fordham University School of Law at the conference The Internal Point of
View in Law and Ethics in February 2006 and at Duke, where I gave an earlier version as the
Rabbi Seymour Siegel Lecture in March 2005.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. III 2003).
2. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6111(a), 6707A(c) (West 2006) (requiring tax advisors to disclose
certain transactions having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion and to "describ[e] any
potential tax benefits expected to result from the transaction").
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have done for years with respect to accountants). 3 An American Bar
Association Task Force on Confidentiality is campaigning vigorously
against the Department of Justice's practice of requiring companies facing
criminal charges to waive attomey-client privilege with respect to internal
investigations as a condition of deferred prosecution. 4
Such responses are unfortunate. The bar's claims about corporate
confidentiality are at best unsubstantiated and at worst fraudulent.
Regardless of whether the bar succeeds in beating back the SEC's "noisy
withdrawal" proposal and the Department of Justice waiver demands,
lawyer-client confidentiality cannot play an important role in contemporary
business regulation. Corporate confidentiality is dead, and the bar's attempt
to suggest that things could be otherwise is an exercise in myth making.
A deeper objection to the bar's current preoccupations is that the bar
largely ignores basic issues posed by recent scandals and regulatory
responses. Two issues are critical. The first is formalism-the doctrine
that only the letter of the law and not its spirit is binding. The bar has long
had trouble defending formalism, but it has never been able to renounce it
either.
The second problem concerns the meaning of client loyalty when the
client is an organization. Although a major fraction of the bar has
represented corporations more or less exclusively for more than a century,
the bar's norms of practice have tended to speak of clients as if they were
individuals. They have thus tended to ignore the internal conflicts of
interest that differentiate organizational from individual clients. Lawyers
have a strong tendency to identify their corporate clients with management.
They know that in principle the corporation is not the same thing as its
management. But they have no clear conception of what else it could be.
Thus, in spite of themselves, lawyers instinctively fall back on views that
conflate the organization and its personnel.
The confusion around these issues undermines the most fundamental
claim of modem professionalism-that professionals can simultaneously
serve their client's interests and the public's interest. Loyalty to clients is
consistent with the public interest because client trust enables professionals
to induce socially desirable behavior. In the case of lawyers, the social
payoff is compliance with law. Thus, the bar's rationale for corporate
confidentiality is that it induces more consultation with lawyers, which in
turn enhances both the client's ability to pursue its own interests and
compliance with law. 5  But even if we concede that corporate
confidentiality induces legal consultation-a concession to be mostly
3. See, e.g., Letter from 79 Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Apr. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/79lawfirms I.htm.
4. See ABA Presidential Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Report to ABA
House of Delegates (June 7, 2005), available at
www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2005).
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retracted below-the claim is implausible without clarification of the ideas
of "compliance" and client interests in the corporate context. If the
"compliance" that lawyers induce means no more than conformity to the
law's literal terms, we have little reason to consider it of social value. And
before we can conclude that confidentiality serves the interests of corporate
clients, we need an explanation that clearly distinguishes between corporate
and managerial interests.
There may be a promising emerging conception of compliance, and the
business lawyer's role in it, implicit in a range of recent regulatory
developments and some relatively low-visibility activities of some business
lawyers. I am thinking of some aspects of securities regulation, such as the
"internal controls" requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, 6 as well as a broad
range of "management-based" regulatory regimes that include the
hazardous substance regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), 7 Project XL of the Environmental Protection
Agency, 8 and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point food safety
regime of the Department of Agriculture. 9 Suggestive lawyer activities
include the work of the tax section of the New York State Bar
Association.10 These activities have implications for the problems of client
interest and compliance, and imply responses to the issues of formalism and
client identity.
I. FORMALISM AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Enron "special purpose entities" and tax shelters share a strong
resemblance. Both are complex transactions structured and executed by
multidisciplinary professional teams for very large fees for the sole purpose
of circumventing legal constraints. They have no "business purpose," and
they manifestly frustrate the public purposes underlying the relevant laws.
The Enron "Raptor" transactions were structured so that illiquid
investments that managers expected to decline in value could be removed
from the company's financial statements. Notes from the board meeting
approving one set of these deals described them as a "hedge" but then
noted, "[d]oes not transfer economic risk but transfers P[rofit] & L[oss]
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. III 2003).
7. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2006).
8. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23,
1995); see also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, What is Project XL?,
http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file2.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
9. See Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806 (July 25, 1996) (codified in scattered sections of 9 C.F.R.); see
also William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in
Law and New Governance in the EU and the US 37, 55-63 (Grdinne de Bairca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2006).
10. Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 Yale J. on Reg. 77, 97-109 (2006).
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volatility.""I The Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives (COBRA)
tax shelters were currency option transactions, the sole purpose of which
was to create economically fictitious losses that would offset economically
real capital gains. Henry Camferdam, an entrepreneur who sold his
technology company in 1999 for about $70 million, was introduced to the
idea when an Ernst & Young (E&Y) accountant called to say, as reported
by the American Lawyer, that E&Y "had a plan that would make that
capital gain disappear."' 12 Legal opinions from Jenkins & Gilchrist and
Sidley Austin LLP would provide "insurance."
' 13
The professionals defended these transactions, and they still do. The
defense depends on formalism. The defenders do not dispute that the
transactions frustrate the purposes of the relevant laws. Rather, defenders
argue, first, that the deals complied with the literal terms of the law, and
second, that compliance with its literal terms was all that the law required.
Both propositions are controversial. Arguably, many of the Enron
transactions and tax shelters did not comply even with the literal terms of
the law. Moreover, it is a matter of dispute whether the securities and tax
laws should be interpreted to require only literal compliance. The securities
laws have very broad definitions of fraud and other prohibited practices that
seem to call for purposive interpretation, but at least some lawyers suggest
that literal compliance with accounting rules should sometimes be
sufficient, even for otherwise misleading practices. 14 In the tax area,
judicial authority seems more or less evenly divided between literalist and
purposive approaches to compliance.15
But I am less interested in the specific mandates of the tax and securities
laws than in the professionals' general understanding of their obligations to
law and the public interest and how that understanding shapes their
conception of their role. All lawyers are formalists some of the time. No
corporate lawyer would refuse to assist in a freeze-out merger with a shell
corporation solely because the transaction is not really a business
combination but a forced buy-out. Nor would any corporate lawyer refuse
to execute a "poison pill" takeover defense on the ground that the "pill" is
not really the dividend it purports to be but rather a device for expanding
board power without a shareholder vote. Although each maneuver depends
on a formalistic interpretation of the relevant statute, the courts have
11. Special Investigative Comm. of the Bd. of Dirs. of Enron Corp., Report of
Investigation 157 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at
http://fl I.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf.
12. Paul Braverman, Helter Shelter, Am. Law., Dec. 2003, at 65, 69.
13. Id.
14. Compare United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-07 (2d Cir. 1969) (rejecting
literalism), with Patti Waldmeir, Inside Track: Don't Blame the Lawyers for Enron, Fin.
Times, Feb. 21, 2002, at 14 (reporting pro-literalism views of lawyers).
15. Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter Battle, in The Crisis in Tax Administration 9, 21-
22 (Henry Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2003).
[Vol. 751456
AFTER CONFIDENTIALITY
approved each, and there are substantial reasons to think they can be
consistent with public policy.16
Some lawyers, however, are formalists all the time, or at least, they are
always ready to be formalists when doing so would serve client interests.
They will invoke the public interest when that helps the client, but they do
not feel constrained by any public interest that is not fully articulated in
positive rules. They thus stand ready to exploit "loopholes" and
"technicalities"--formal interpretations of rules that thwart their underlying
purposes.
For a substantial segment of the bar, such formalism is a key feature of
the professional ideal. In the debate about Vinson & Elkins's (V&E) work
for Enron, Lawrence Fox of the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission insisted,
"Clients are entitled to know there are loopholes .... If you want to stop
that, you have to rewrite the law.'' 17 Stephen Gillers of New York
University Law School said, "The job of a lawyer is to figure out how to
accomplish the client's objectives within the law and if that can be done
only through a technicality, that is not the lawyer's fault." 18
There is, of course, another view. It was concisely expressed by the
Enron accountant Sherron Watkins in her famous memo to Ken Lay. She
made no mention of any of the accounting rules Arthur Andersen and V&E
relied on. Instead, she noted that "[t]he overriding basic principle of
accounting is that if you explain the 'accounting treatment' to a man on the
street, would you influence his investing decisions? Would he sell or buy
the stock based on a thorough understanding of the facts? If so, you best
present [such facts] correctly ... "19
This appeal to an "overriding basic principle" contrasts markedly with
the preoccupation of the Andersen accountants and the V&E lawyers with
the technical requirements of Financial Accounting Standards Board
standards. There is no indication that these professionals ever asked the
question, "Is this misleading?" Or, if they did ask the question-as in a
section of V&E's response to the Watkins letter headed "Bad
Cosmetics" 20 -that these professionals considered the answer relevant to
the permissibility of the transaction.
16. The formalism involved in the freeze-out merger and the poison pill resemble the
type defended in Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967). Language is stretched away from its
original purposes in order to accommodate current social norms in a changed environment.
A key feature of the more defensible forms of this practice is that they are sufficiently
transparent to be reviewable by public officials. By contrast, a key feature of the Enron-style
earnings games and tax shelters is that they presuppose or exacerbate inadequate public
accountability. Enron tried to hide information from the public, and tax shelter strategies
depend on the IRS's inadequate enforcement resources.
17. Waldmeir, supra note 14, at 14.
18. Id.
19. Letter from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth L. Lay (Aug. 14, 2001), available at
http:////news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf.
20. Letter from Max Hendrick III, Att'y, Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., to James V. Derrick,
Jr., Executive Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Enron Corp. (Oct. 15, 2001), available at
2001 WL 1764266, at *7.
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Among securities lawyers, the most articulate speakers are defenders of
formalism. Those who have doubts tend to be silent or ambiguous. But the
tax bar is openly divided, and a major contingent of practitioners, many in
the big established firms, have taken a strong position against what they,
along with the IRS, call "abusive" tax practice. They oppose the new
shelter practice as socially "inefficient." While the securities lawyers have
opposed SEC regulation of their practice with remarkable uniformity, the
anti-shelter tax faction, led by the tax sections of the American Bar
Association and, especially, the New York State Bar, have supported IRS
initiatives and even called for their strengthening. The anti-shelter tax
faction supports demanding "due diligence" requirements for shelter
opinions, and even, in some cases, the requirement that practitioners make
shelter client lists available to the IRS. 21
Note the difference between the premises of the defenders of V&E and
those of the New York Tax Section. The idea of a "loophole"-a course of
action that fits the letter but violates the spirit of the law-is unintelligible
to the former. To them, as Gillers put it, "[i]t's either legal or it's not."'22
But the New York Tax Section accepts the IRS's premise that there is an
important category of "abusive" practices that can be identified
independently of the literal terms of the law. 23
The practitioners on both sides of the formalism debate are not just
arguing about the characteristics of prevailing law. The formalists do not
argue only that they should give their clients the benefit of formalistic
manipulation because the law creates or accepts those benefits. The
antiformalists do not argue only that literal compliance is insufficient
because that's what the law says. Indeed, what we might call the legal
positivist case-lawyers should be formalist because the law is formalist-
is much stronger in the tax area, where the bar is divided, than in the
securities area, where formalism is virtually unchallenged. In the tax area,
there has long been an "economic substance" doctrine that condemns literal
but counter-purposive positions, but it has never been uncontested. Yet,
there has also been a minority position that formal compliance is enough
(and it seems to have gained ground in recent years). 24 In the securities
area, however, it is hard to square formalism with the open-ended nature of
the securities acts' fraud norms and with the accountant's practice of
opining with respect to financial statements, not only that they comply with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), but that they "fairly
and accurately" portray the financial condition of the company. V&E's
position implies that a financial statement can be knowingly misleading
("bad cosmetics") and yet, so long as it complies with GAAP, non-
fraudulent. There is no authority for this position, and some against. Most
21. Rostain, supra note 10, at 96-109.
22. Waldmeir, supra note 14, at 14.
23. Rostain, supra note 10, at 97-109.
24. See Bankman, supra note 15, at 2 1-22.
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importantly, securities laws prohibit statements that are "misleading" tout
court. It is hard to find loopholes in such terms. Yet, formalism flourishes
in the securities area even more than in the tax area.
Clearly, then, lawyers are not simply taking the law as they find it.
Lawyers are arguing for and against formalism because they see stakes for
society and for themselves in these issues. The stakes for the profession
involve lawyers' own sense of self-respect and dignity, the image of
themselves they present to their clients, and the profession's image before
the public.
The lawyer image that best justifies formalist practice is libertarian. It
sees government action as presumptively suspect and the lawyer as
performing a valuable role in forcing greater clarity in the norms that
authorize and regulate such action. Lawyers market themselves to their
clients as champions committed to minimizing the interference of
government with their pursuit of their private goals. They justify
themselves to the public as an essential institution of government restraint.
Formalist evasion pushes the rule maker to articulate its goals more
precisely. The cycle of evasion and re-articulation moves upward to greater
completeness and clarity. Completeness and clarity is good because it
increases people's ability to plan their affairs. It is further valued as an
engine of democracy. Informal interpretation, John Manning complains,
"relieves the legislature of both the responsibility and accountability for
doing" its job.25
Many lawyers will not be comfortable with the libertarian premise that
we should be categorically more wary of government activity than of
business activity. But whatever one thinks of this starting point, formalism
does not follow. Both the certainty and the accountability arguments for
formalism are unconvincing.
The certainty argument ignores that increased certainty for some people
may imply reduced certainty for others. The argument is also wrong to
assert any strong correlation between formalistic legality and the social
experience of predictability or control of one's life. For most people in
many realms of life, predictability is best furthered by laws that track
ordinary social expectations, and that will often be an informal legality.26
Enron illustrates both points. Whatever certainty formalistic interpretation
gave to Andrew Fastow and his cronies, it produced disruptive surprise for
most other stakeholders in the company. And an interpretation of the rules
that limited off-balance sheet finance to a disinterested informal judgment
25. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2437 (2003).
26. See 1 Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order 118
(1973) ("What has been promulgated or announced beforehand will often be only a very
imperfect formulation of principles which people can better honour in action than express in
words. Only if one believes that all law is an expression of the will of a legislator and has
been invented by him, rather than an expression of the principles required by the exigencies
of a going order, does it seem that previous announcement is an indispensable condition of
knowledge of the law.").
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about whether it made sense would have produced disclosures that would
have been more accurately interpreted than the formalistic manipulations
that were used.
As for accountability, note to begin with that formalists do not confine
their efforts to settings in which there are well-functioning processes of
policy monitoring and revision. On the contrary, one of the disturbing
features of Enron-style securities practice and tax shelter practice is that
they depend on or exacerbate weaknesses in processes of public
enforcement and oversight. Thus, Enron used literalistic interpretation of
disclosure norms to justify the concealment of information necessary for
public appraisal of its practices. Tax shelter practice is designed to exploit
the IRS's limited audit and litigation resources. The low probabilities that
public authorities will detect their practices have influenced lawyers' advice
in favor of aggressive tax positions, and practitioners have gone to elaborate
lengths to make it hard for the IRS to identify its products. Legislative
revision to take account of practices that never come to light is unlikely.
More generally, the demand of formalism that government specify fully
the obligations of citizens before enforcement increasingly seems both too
strong and too weak a condition of accountability. It is too strong a
condition because the government lacks the ability to anticipate and specify
in advance the full range of situations to which public norms apply. The
increase in recent decades in the pace of innovation in financial markets has
exacerbated this problem. Even if public enforcement resources were more
balanced with private evasion resources, the government could not keep up
with the capacities of professionals advising the private sector for evasive
innovation. Joseph Bankman suggests that the ultimate practical result of a
consistently formalist tax regime would be that no tax would be collected
from anyone with access to good professional advice.27 One might also
predict that the result of a consistently formalist securities disclosure regime
would be that all corporate wealth would be expropriated by insiders.
But in other respects formalism is a weak condition of accountability.
Formalism demands only that norms be specified, not that they serve their
purposes. A formalist regime breeds not only counter-purposivist evasion
but also counter-purposivist compliance---costly activity dictated by the
literal terms of rules that make little contribution to their underlying
purposes. Formalism imposes no constraints on the substance of norms.
Thus, the Enron-era crisis of under-compliance has been followed by a
crisis of over-compliance in the implementation of the "internal controls"
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. The statute requires management to certify
the adequacy of the company's financial controls, 28 and managers
necessarily depend on accountants for this function. The statute and
regulations are not specific on what adequacy means. The accountants,
encouraged by their regulator (the Public Company Accounting Oversight
27. See Bankman, supra note 15, at 19-20.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (Supp. III 2003).
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Board) and empowered by their oligopolistic industry structure, chose to
interpret the statute in a way that served no purposes but their own. They
overreacted to minor deficiencies and demanded costly safeguards out of
proportion to the magnitudes of the risks involved. They minimized
liability risk to themselves and generated enormous fees, but they imposed
unjustified costs on the companies and the public. 29
Donald Nicolaisen, former Chief Accountant at the SEC, recently
complained about the "compliance mindset," by which he meant both
evasive and defensive formalism. In rhetoric strikingly reminiscent of
Sherron Watkins's forlorn exhortation, he suggested that those who prepare
financial statements should ask themselves what kind of information they
rely on in making their own investment decisions and then use the answer
as a guide to deciding how to report on their clients.30 In the current
climate, the idea that the information lawyers and accountants produce
under securities law should be useful to anyone comes easily only to
mavericks or government officials.
The libertarian/formalist model of lawyering has become a liability for
lawyers. The wedge that formalism drives between legal norm and public
purpose undermines the profession's claim that its services have public
value. This is increasingly true as the image of formalist evasion-the price
of a cycle of progressive clarification of law-seems less plausible than the
image of a downward spiral of reciprocally exacerbating legal rigidity and
opportunistic evasion.
There is another dimension to the problem. The libertarian/formalist
vision disables the professions from responding to the demands and
opportunities of a style of regulation that has become increasingly
prominent in recent decades. Sarbanes-Oxley is a recent example of this
critical trend. The trend extends to education (the No Child Left Behind
Act 31), environmental law (e.g., Project XL 32 or Habitat Conservations
Plans33), product safety (e.g., Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
regime in food safety 34), occupational health and safety (e.g., OSHA's
hazardous substance program35), and many other areas.
29. See Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting
Corporate Law's "Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems", 31 J. Corp. L. 949 (2006),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftnabstract-id=808084.
30. Jack T. Ciesielski, What Keeps the SEC Busy--2005, Analyst's Acct. Observer, Jan.
18, 2005, at 1, 2.
31. See No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
32. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23,
1995).
33. Such plans are developed and approved pursuant to § 10 of the Endangered Species
Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000).
34. See Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806 (July 25, 1996) (codified in scattered sections of 9 C.F.R.).
35. See 29 C.F.R. 1910.1200 (2006).
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These regimes are a response to the problems that defeat formalism-that
the regulator never knows as much about the problems she regulates as the
regulated, that even if she were omniscient she could never express her
understanding in sufficient detail to preclude ambiguity, and that the
problem and potential solutions change more rapidly than the regulations
can be revised.36
In the emerging approach to regulation, the regulator looks to the
regulated to identify problems and solutions and to continuously revise her
understanding of both. The regulator promises leniency, flexible
accommodation, and technical assistance in exchange for transparency and
collaborative information sharing on the part of the regulated. Among the
characteristic features of these legal regimes are substantive norms that are
deliberately under-specified coupled with duties on the part of the regulated
party to themselves identify and clarify the ambiguities in the norms. The
"management discussion and analysis" requirement of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is an early example, and the Sarbanes-Oxley
requirement that management assess the strengths and weaknesses of its
"internal controls" is a newer one. 37 In such measures, the regulator
elaborates goals and, rather than telling the regulated exactly what she
should do in order to attain them, orders the regulated to herself identify the
most effective responses and to both report and implement them.
Moreover, explicitly or effectively, these regimes charge the regulated with
a duty to disclose to the regulator deficiencies in the regulator's formulation
of the rules. An example is the provision proposed for (but ultimately left
out of) the Restatement (Third) of Torts on the preemptive effect of
administrative regulation in products liability cases. Compliance with
administrative requirements immunizes the manufacturer from tort liability
if she has disclosed to the regulator any information that suggests the
requirements are inadequate. 38  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
provision that treats as a significant mitigating factor for corporate liability
the adoption of reasonable compliance procedures is in the same spirit.39
In an important sense, these new regimes vindicate the legitimate goal of
the libertarian/formalist vision: the progressive clarification of law. Like
the libertarians, the new reformers aspire to produce a progressively
clarifying cycle of revision, but one that moves much faster. Although the
core governing norms are typically expressed in general terms, both
regulators and practitioners are expected to describe their practices as
explicitly as possible. Yet, in the new regimes, normative specification is
genuinely a means to clarification and understanding, not a shield from the
pressures of public accountability. Where form diverges from purpose,
practitioners should at least signal that fact to the public in a way that
36. See Simon, supra note 9, at 55-63.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 72 41(a)(4)-(5) (Supp. III 2003).
38. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 4 (Proposed Final Draft, 1997).
39. 18 U.S.C.S. App. § 8C2.5(f) (LexisNexis 2006).
1462 [Vol. 75
AFTER CONFIDENTIALITY
facilitates convergence. Practitioners must report deficiencies in the
regulations to the regulators. And where the demands of such norms are
ambiguous, those subject to the norms have a duty at least to make their
conduct transparent to regulators, so that regulators can assess whether the
norms require re-articulation.
These regimes try to co-opt the more technologically dynamic, socially
responsible, and image-conscious members of the relevant industries.
These firms are not averse to standards that enhance public confidence in
the industry and its products, especially if the standards are generally
enforced so that their competitors are precluded from offering lower prices
by ignoring them. This means that in any given field of practice, the client
community is likely to divide in its attitudes toward regulation. High-road
clients will support regulation and want to participate in a way that makes
the new regimes work. Low-road clients will want to minimize regulatory
burdens any way they can. The high-road constituency means that lawyers
who have a professional stake in associating their work with the vindication
of the public purposes underlying the regime will have political allies when
they work collectively for both regulatory and professional reforms that
undercut opportunities for formalistic evasion. These clients will also
demand lawyering services that require both skills and attitudes different
from those associated with formalistic evasion (or defensive formalism).
These new skills involve the ability to assess and revise norms and
institutional structures in the light of their evolving purposes. This is not a
radical idea. It is quite similar to the vision of lawyering Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks expounded in the 1950s.40 Recent developments in the
economy and regulation have enlarged the opportunities for this type of
lawyering. However, at the same time, we have seen a revival of the
libertarian/formalist rival of this vision.
A potential role for bar organizations in the new regime is to facilitate
aggregation of information and collective deliberation among practitioners
about emerging perceptions of problems in the existing regulatory apparatus
and ways for improving them. Lawyers should be among the first to
perceive the problems, and if they shared information and ideas, they would
be in a good position to formulate advice and proposals for the regulators.
Such a role is well within the traditional commitments of bar associations to
public service and law reform. It would be a difficult role for an inclusive
or integrated bar representing all the lawyers in a jurisdiction. Lawyers
with ideologies of their own or clients that committed them to low-road
strategies of resistance or evasion would not support such activities. But
voluntary bar associations with high-road members might be attracted to
them. The efforts of the New York State Bar Association tax section,
mentioned above, suggest possibilities.
40. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 209-40 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
Found. Press 1994) (1958).
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It seems doubtful that the .libertarian/formalist view and the emerging
"new-governance" view reflected in the new regulatory developments can
be accommodated within a single professional vision. If the bar is to have a
common vision of its role and responsibilities, it must choose. The choice
is not dictated by either tradition or self-interest. But the newer approach
has the best promise of vindicating the bar's claim that its service to private
clients furthers public interests, and it seems to present the best
opportunities to enhance the bar's social influence and status.
II. ORGANIZATIONS AND CLIENT LOYALTY
In its defense of its work for Enron, V&E said, "When clients ask us [if
they can do something] our job is to ... figure out if there is a legally
appropriate way to do it. That's what we do. And so does every other law
firm in America. '41 I've been focusing on how we understand the idea of
"lawful," and especially the relative roles of letter and spirit. Now I want to
turn to the idea of "client" presupposed by this rhetoric.
To suggest that a corporate lawyer's duty to her client requires her to do
her best to effectuate a manager's request to find a lawful way to withhold
information from the shareholders is to suggest that the manager is the
client. Every corporate lawyer knows that the manager is not the client.
Yet, most corporate lawyers think and talk much of the time as if the
manager were the client. Moreover, few corporate lawyers have a coherent
idea of what a corporate client could be other than the manager.
The bar's rhetoric shows a strong tendency on the one hand to imply that
the manager is the client or on the other to beg the question of whom (or
what), if not the manager, the client is. In its vigorous opposition to the
SEC's "noisy withdrawal" proposal, the bar repeatedly invoked Justice
Warren Burger's distinction between the lawyer, a "loyal representative
whose duty it is to present the client's case in the most favorable possible
light," and the accountant, a "watchdog" whose "ultimate allegiance [is] to
the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing
public. '42 The distinction raises the question of who, once we exclude
creditors, shareholders, and the investing public, remains for the corporate
lawyer to be loyal to. Managers are the first group to come to mind, but
they are not necessarily a more deserving one.
Until 1982, about a century after the emergence of modem corporate law
practice, professional responsibility doctrine spoke of clients only as
solitary individuals. Finally, the ABA produced Model Rule 1.13, which
acknowledged that organizations were distinctive. The basic idea of Model
Rule 1.13 was that agents (i.e., managers) should be treated as speaking for
the client when they had authority to do so. 43 This was plausible but
ambiguous. The rule provided more specific guidance for one troubling
41. Waldmeir, supra note 14, at 14.
42. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
43. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(a) (2005).
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category of situations: In essence, it said that when managers are acting
illegally in ways likely to harm the corporation, the lawyer should think
about going to the board. Although the disciplinary rules did not address it
specifically, there was another category of situations where corporate and
civil procedure doctrine suggested that lawyers should stand back from
managers: where the managers had a clear and explicit conflict of interest,
notably, with respect to compensation arrangements and derivative suits
against them. Here, the doctrine prescribed that managers get their own
lawyers, and corporate counsel again take instruction from the board.44
Key ambiguities remained. Two are especially important. First, what
was the lawyer to do when the board encouraged or acquiesced in
managerial lawlessness? If we take seriously the principle that only
authorized conduct can be attributed to the organization, then the board can
no longer be regarded as speaking for the client. In this situation, the
inference would be natural that the best way to protect the corporation's
interests would be for the lawyer to consult the shareholders, the corporate
constituency that would usually have the greatest stake and to whom the
law gives authority to remove the directors. In addition, or in the
alternative, it might seem necessary to go to government agencies with
supervisory authority over the corporation. Yet, when the SEC suggested in
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.45 that lawyers might go to the
shareholders, or in its Sarbanes-Oxley "noisy withdrawal" proposal that
lawyers should send a weak signal to the SEC itself, the bar rebelled. Most
strikingly, the bar opposed such responsibilities on the ground that they
undennined loyalty to the client.46 Again, lawyers seemed to be forgetting
that the managers were not the client.
Second, how is the lawyer to understand managerial lawlessness? In
particular, should any managerial breach of fiduciary duty be deemed
lawless, hence triggering duties to go to the board (and perhaps beyond)?
In practice, lawyers interpreted lawlessness to mean either breach of
criminal or regulatory law on the one hand or explicit conflict of interest
situations on the other. But that left a range of decisions that were
potentially breaches of fiduciary duty but not violations of specific legal
commands or explicit conflicts. Consider takeover defense, for example.
To require that lawyers routinely pass judgment on whether managerial
decisions on such matters are in shareholders' interests seems implausible,
but routine deference to such decisions ignores patent, if indirect, conflicts
of interest.
It happens that an interesting subcategory of such judgments includes
financial reporting issues of the Enron variety. Enron's managers were not
44. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 534-39 (4th ed.
2005).
45. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
46. See Hazard, supra note 44, at 184-90; Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron:
Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our
Commitment to Our Clients, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1243.
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unusual in devoting major time and effort to conduct that was intended to
create a favorable effect on their company's financial statements. Public
corporation managers are constantly proposing and executing transactions
intended to improve their accounting numbers or structuring ordinary
transactions to induce a desired appearance on financial statements.
"Earnings management" is one name for it, and although it is controversial,
it is more or less shamelessly indulged, if not promoted, by business
professionals of all stripes. Long after the negative publicity about its
Enron activities began, V&E continued to advertise on its website its
expertise in the use of offshore entities to help businesses achieve "off
balance sheet treatment" for debt.
Of course, many types of earnings management violate securities laws. It
is even arguable that earnings management activities should be deemed
presumptive violations of the securities laws. But the question to consider
at this point is whether even otherwise lawful earnings management can
ever be consistent with managers' fiduciary duties to their corporations.
When the manager asks the lawyer, accountant, or banker to assist in
earnings management, he is proposing to withhold or obscure infornation
that shareholders would consider relevant to their investment decisions.
Why is such a proposal not a presumptive breach of fiduciary duty? It is no
answer that the manager's duties are to the corporation, not the
shareholders. The corporation's interests embrace the shareholders' interest
in unbiased financial reporting.47 What if the manager asserts that the
accounting treatment she is trying to achieve would be more reflective of
the true financial condition of the company? This position has little
credibility when the manager is seeking to withhold information entirely,
rather than just influence its presentation. Even where the manager's plan
affects only presentation, it is questionable whether she should be heard on
such subjects. Financial accounting is the most important mechanism of
47. Some managers apparently believe that earnings management that is not otherwise
prohibited is consistent with their fiduciary duty to the corporation because the shareholders
have an interest in keeping the share price up. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal
Perspectives: Reconciling the Conflict Between Current and Future Investors, 89 Minn. L.
Rev. 1044, 1049 (2005) (approving this view), While unclear as a matter of doctrine, the
view seems wrong as a matter of principle. Earnings management is likely to prop up share
price only in the short term. In the long run, it is apt to undermine share price by impairing
the corporation's reputation for financial integrity. Moreover, financial disclosure is a key
mechanism of managerial accountability to shareholders. Earnings management hurts
shareholders by impairing accountability. Of course, if one looked at shareholders
individually, one would find divergent interests. Short-term traders might be grateful for
manipulation, while diversified buy-and-hold types would not be. But the public corporation
manager's duty cannot be defined in terms of the interests of whomever happens to hold her
company's shares at the moment. Duty should be elaborated in terms of a hypothetical
shareholder with interests that are generally regarded as important and legitimate. This was
the approach the Supreme Court took in defining materiality under the securities laws in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality with
reference to the interests of a "reasonable shareholder"). If taken in the fiduciary duty
context, it would lead to the conclusion that manipulations designed solely to produce
favorable accounting effects are not the shareholders' interests.
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managerial accountability. To give managers influence over it is like
allowing students to grade their own exams.48
I do not mean to suggest that the amount of deference lawyers should
give to managerial assertions about the interests of their corporate clients is
an easy question. On the contrary, my point is precisely that it is a hard
question. The bar, however, has not treated it as such. That V&E could see
its participation in the Enron deceptions as a matter of loyalty to its client
bespeaks deep confusion that seems to arise from a failure to treat seriously
the meaning of organizational representation.
We see the same confusion in the bar's anxiety about the pressures on
corporate attorney-client confidentiality. I argued above that the formalism
problem undermines the claim that legal advice promotes some socially
desirable form of compliance. It is time to observe another implausible
feature of the argument for corporate confidentiality-the contention that
confidentiality plays an important role in inducing managers to confer with
the corporation's lawyers. The bar's arguments often seem to assume that
the privilege belongs to the managers. Of course, the confidentiality
proponents must know that this is not the case; the privilege belongs to the
organization. But if the proponents really understand this, it is difficult to
see how they can think that confidentiality is important in inducing
disclosure to counsel.
Consider: Because the privilege belongs to the organization, the
organization can waive it no matter how costly disclosure is to the manager.
In fact, we know that corporations often cooperate in prosecutions against
errant former managers in order to gain leniency for themselves. 49 And
they sometimes sue former managers for damages for wrongdoing. Boards
have a fiduciary duty to sacrifice managers when it is in the interest of the
organization to do so. And the decision to waive privilege is made by the
board sitting at the time of the waiver decision, not the one sitting at the
time of the communication. 50 Thus, a current board cannot be sure that a
future board will not waive privilege with respect to the current board's
communications. A derivative plaintiff can often discover a manager's
communications with corporate counsel even over the objection of the
board.51 Moreover, the privilege puts no constraint on disclosure within the
organization. A corporate lawyer who learns about wrongdoing from a
48. See William H. Simon, Earnings Management as a Professional Responsibility
Problem, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 83 (2005); see generally William H. Simon, Whom (or What)
Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 Cal. L.
Rev. 57 (2003).
49. For the most recent of many examples, see Lynnley Browning, A Single Trial for 18
Named in Tax Shelters, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 2006, at C3 (discussing KPMG's agreement to
avoid prosecution by cooperating in a case against former partners).
50. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
51. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1970) (setting out a
multifactor balancing test for deciding when management can assert privilege in a derivative
suit).
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manager will often have a duty to report the facts to the manager's
superiors.
Recall also that the privilege protects only the communication and not the
information it contains. This means that when a corporate lawyer learns
something that he must disclose under the civil discovery or securities laws,
the privilege does not affect his duty to see that the information is disclosed,
whether or not the communicating manager wishes the information
disclosed.
Given these long-standing limits on the privilege, it has always been
irrational for a manager to make disclosures to the corporation's counsel
that she would not have been willing to make in the absence of any
confidentiality safeguards. If managers are more wary now, it is probably
because recent scandals have made them more alert to the long-standing
limits, not because of prosecutors' new practices. Fortunately, managers
have strong incentives to make disclosures without confidentiality. Aside
from any sense of responsibility to the organization, managers risk liability
by not disclosing. For example, they may lose the "business judgment" and
"advice of counsel" defenses to civil claims.
The rationale for confidentiality in the corporate context has always been
out of place with the contours of the doctrine. If our only concern is to
induce managerial communication to lawyers, we should give the privilege
to the managers. We do not. The privilege belongs to the corporation with
the consequence that a board can waive at the expense of errant officers,
and a successor board can waive at the expense of an errant past board.
This means that corporate counsel can never assure managers of strong
confidentiality.
Clearly, there is a competing consideration that holds us back from
following out the logic of the confidentiality rationale. I am unaware of any
articulation of this consideration, but I think it is clear enough: client
loyalty. If the bar's argument were right, giving the privilege to the
manager might actually induce more compliance. But it would not be
tolerable because it would too often require the lawyer to remain silent in
the face of conduct that was both unlawful and harmful to her
organizational client. To preclude the lawyer from intervening to prevent
lawless harm to the client would affront all the values that give dignity to
the professional role.
There is thus a strong tension between the goal of managerial trust and
that of corporate client loyalty. If managerial trust in lawyers is based on
confidentiality, rather than a shared sense of loyalty to the organization's
goals and norms, it will have to come at the expense of client loyalty.
Confronting this tension more squarely might lead the bar to take a less
hostile attitude toward the new regulatory initiatives that are compromising
confidentiality. The demands to cut back confidentiality do not occur in
isolation. More often than not, these demands are part of the approach to
regulation I mentioned earlier that aspires to combine transparency with
leniency and flexibility in order to induce collaborative and continuously
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revised public-private ordering. At least some corporate clients have an
interest in embracing these new approaches.
The assistance that lawyers can best provide in these new regimes has
less to do with keeping secrets and more to do with problem solving,
devising more efficient and flexible responses that reconcile the client's
legitimate interests with the public purposes of the regulatory regimes. The
bar's current preoccupation with reassuring nervous managers is misplaced.
The project is superfluous for most managers and futile for the rest. It
would take a revolutionary expansion of current confidentiality doctrine to
enable lawyers to promise a manager that she will not be worse off for
having confided in the lawyer. Moreover, in these new regimes, the most
important kind of trust lawyers must inculcate is not of managers in lawyers
but trust of regulators and other regime participants in their clients. Such
trust is the precondition of the autonomy and flexibility the new regimes
contemplate. Lawyers' disclosure duties are entirely compatible with this
latter kind of trust.
Of course, many areas of law have been unaffected by the new regulatory
models, and in those that have been affected, the models have been
imperfectly implemented. Transparency norms are often weak or weakly
enforced. Prosecutorial discretion can be arbitrary and can impose large
costs on relatively well-behaved companies. Prosecutors often respond to
voluntary transparency, not by leniency, but by seizing on the opportunity
for an easy and potentially highly publicized victory. Once they invest
resources in an investigation, prosecutors are reluctant, even if they find
little or nothing, to close it with nothing to show for their effort. And of
course, transparency opens the company to private litigation, particularly
class action suits, a process which corporate executives deeply (and to my
mind, plausibly) distrust as rife with arbitrariness and opportunism.
The arguments that corporate counsel make in private for confidentiality,
as opposed to the public ones I have criticized, usually emphasize these
defects in the public and private enforcement processes. Corporate lawyers
and their clients value confidentiality as a defense against opportunistic
prosecutors or class action lawyers. A small quantum of evidence, perhaps
taken out of context, is sometimes enough to permit these actors to impose,
or threaten to impose, enormous procedural costs on businesses that may
plausibly believe themselves largely blameless.
There are, of course, direct responses to these dangers. Some of the same
mechanisms of transparency and accountability that the new regulatory
regimes impose on businesses are readily adaptable to the conduct of
agencies and prosecutors themselves. Prosecutors should articulate
standards for the exercise of discretion, measure their own performance
under the standards, provide transparent procedures for revising the
standards in the light of experience, and provide remedies for targets that
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believe they have been harmed by violations of the standards. 52 Recent
class action reform has not eliminated the extortionate potential of the
procedure; more reform would be desirable.
Confidentiality is not a substitute for reforms that directly address defects
in the judicial process. It may help some companies avoid meritless
charges and wasteful proceedings, but from a social point of view,
confidentiality makes things worse. Confidentiality can be asserted to
block access to evidence for meritorious claims as easily as for meritless
ones. It makes all claims more difficult and expensive to bring.
It is easy to imagine a role for lawyer organizations in addressing
litigation abuses, but there are no outstanding examples. The ABA has no
commission on class action abuses or regulatory enforcement discretion.
Instead, it gives us a Task Force on Confidentiality. No doubt, conflicts
among its vast membership over the first two topics make them difficult for
the organization to address. Confidentiality is a lowest common
denominator. But a more specialized voluntary bar might plausibly take on
these issues.
Finally, let me briefly observe that the tax shelter practice addressed by
IRS Circular 23053 raises a further critical issue about the meaning of client
loyalty. A central aspect of tax shelter practice is a legal opinion that the
statutory interpretation on which the deal is based is valid, or perhaps "more
likely than not" to be upheld if litigated. Whether given to clients or non-
clients, these opinions are always "third party" opinions in an important
sense. Although they are framed as advice to the client, this is not their
purpose. The client seeks the opinion so that in the event of an IRS
challenge she can bolster her argument that she believed in "good faith" that
the transaction was valid, and hence should not be subject to penalties.
Here we have a situation where, under the guise of giving advice to their
clients, lawyers confer on clients immunity from public sanctions. The
selfish interests of lawyers and clients would best be served if
confidentiality could also be claimed for such transactions. That way,
clients could play the "audit lottery" and then pull out the letter only if they
should be detected. But whatever the strength of the arguments for
confidentiality in the usual context, they are hard to take at all seriously
when the lawyer is not so much giving legal advice as exercising a power of
public dispensation. Thus, the IRS's elaborate and ingenious tax shelter
regulations are designed to make tax shelter practice more transparent and
accountable. 54
Note that in this context lawyers have assumed an intermediating public-
private role that has some resemblance to the one I suggested is called for
52. For suggestions as to how transparency and accountability methods might be applied
to prosecutors in the context of capital cases, see James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of
Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030 (2000).
53. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.93 (2005).
54. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 10; Herbert N. Belier, The New Penalty Regime Finally Arrives:
Proceed with Caution!, Tax Executive, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 491.
[Vol. 751470
AFTER CONFIDENTIALITY
by new regulatory trends more generally. In principle, the function of the
opinion is both to inform the client and to reassure the IRS of the client's
good faith. This development illustrates that the idea of a more public
lawyering role is not as radical as it might sound. But of course, it also
shows that such a role can be corrupted. The new regimes do not dispense
with the need for adequate sanctions-especially with respect to disclosure
norms-and monitoring. And they require new methods of accountability
for lawyers. Although they are not adequate in the absence of effective
penalties or auditing resources, the IRS rules move in precisely the right
direction. In effect, the IRS is moving toward auditing lawyers and
accountants, as a means of assessing the reliability of their vouching for
their clients. This is the logic of the new regime.
CONCLUSION
In confronting the crisis, lawyers have two options that parallel the
choices that the new regulatory environment presents their clients. The low
road-the one that demands least effort and imagination but has the least
promise of neutralizing the threats to public respect and independence-is
the one lawyers seem to be taking. This involves clinging to the
prerogatives of formalism and an interpretation of confidentiality that
rationalizes treating managers as if they were clients. The high road-the
most difficult in the short run but the one with the most promise for the
profession and its role in society-requires the rejection of formalism and
of the tacit managerialism of current confidentiality efforts. The high road
requires lawyers to interpret their professed commitment to law in terms of
spirit and purpose rather than literal terms, and requires them to confront
explicitly the tensions of organizational client loyalty, especially the tension
between client loyalty and managerial trust.
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